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The debate around directly elected mayors is
hot (for example Bottom and Reiser, 2014;
Copus and Dadd, 2014; Eckersley and Timm-
Arnold, 2014; Hambleton and Sweeting, 2014):
as Fenwick and Massey (2014, pp. 309–310)
pointed out, there is a new urgency to
understand more about this model of urban
governance and to fill the gap between rhetoric
and reality with more evidence. In this article,
we aim to contribute to this issue by presenting
the Italian case.
Italy has a strong mayor form of local
government (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002, p.
58), and it can be described as a southern type
of local government system (Page and
Goldsmith, 1987; Denters and Rose, 2005)
characterized by a Napoleonic administrative
tradition (Hesse and Sharpe, 1991; Bennett,
1993; Ongaro, 2010) and permeated by patterns
of clientelism and patronage (Goldsmith, 1992).
Directly elected mayors were introduced in
Italy by Law No. 81 in 1993; this reform—
which is generally considered successful
(Baldini, 2002, p. 374)—introduced a
‘presidential model of local government’
(Cassese et al., 2003), replacing the previous
model based on a proportional system. This
change was welcomed by almost all the main
opinion leaders at that time—as Gianoli wrote
(2010, p. 187): ‘Corruption, the imbalance
between legislative and executive powers, the
pervasiveness of political parties, and the lack
of a strong leadership within a governance
context became the key issues to be addressed’.
Our article presents the main aspects of
direct election of mayors in Italy, highlighting
five main effects on local government systems.
We conclude with lessons for other countries.
The article contributes to the wider debate
around city leadership, making the argument
that the traditional leader-centric and positional
view of leadership should be complemented by
a more distributed and dynamic view of
leadership as an activity, rather than a position
of authority.
We built our arguments from a critical
analysis of the literature, enriched by our
experiences working in local politics in Italy
with several mayors. Copus (2003, p. 34)
welcomed practical experience like ours: ‘The
experience of being immersed in local politics
throws up the possibility that traditional
research into such a complex world may be all
the better for being filtered through what
councillors actually do and say in more
unguarded moments’.
Background
The Italian state is divided into four levels of
government: central government; 20 regions
(regioni, the intermediate subnational level of
government); provinces; and municipalities
(comuni). Provinces and metropolitan cities
(consisting of more than 8,000 comuni and
about 110 provinces) represent the local
government level.
Each municipality has a mayor, a cabinet, a
city council and an administrative structure. In
Italy, the mayor represents the municipality
both politically and legally and acts as the main
government official in the functions delegated
by the state to the municipality. Basically, the
mayor performs three independent functions:
head of the municipality, leader of the majority
party (or coalition) and government official
(Vaciago, 1999). The mayor appoints the
members of the cabinet, who are not necessarily
elected by the citizens. Moreover, the mayor
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appoints the heads of offices and services and
the representatives of the municipality in local
quangos and municipal corporations.
In Italy, mayors are elected directly by
citizens with different electoral systems
depending on the size of the municipality. In
municipalities with fewer than 15,000
inhabitants, the party receiving a simple
majority in the election wins, and gets two-
thirds of the seats, and their leading candidate
becomes mayor (winner takes all). In
municipalities with more than 15,000
inhabitants, there could be two separate ballots:
a mayor is elected in the first round if one
candidate gets more than 50% of the votes; if
not, a run-off election is held between the two
candidates receiving the highest number of
votes. In both cases, the coalition of parties
supporting the winning mayor gets 60% of the
seats. The elections are held every five years,
and the same person cannot be re-elected mayor
for more than two consecutive terms. The
resignation of the mayor, or a vote of no
confidence, result in the automatic resignation
of the whole city council.
Main effects of directly elected mayors on
local government systems
More stability and improved decision-making
Before the introduction of directly elected
mayors in 1993, less than 1% of the Italian main
local governments (the provincial capitals) had
cabinets that lasted for the entire (five-year)
term (Baldini, 2002, p. 368). After this reform,
councils have stronger political majorities, are
less fragmented and are consequently relatively
stable in supporting a mayor (Clarke et al.,
1996; Larsen, 2000). Moreover, the decision-
making process and policy implementation
benefited from the introduction of directly
elected mayors in terms of efficiency, since
decisions were faster than under the previous
system (Baldini and Legnante, 1998). This is in
line with other studies that have highlighted
improved decision-making as one of the benefits
of having directly elected mayors (for example
Sims, 2011).
Greater accountability on roles and responsibilities
The directly elected mayor is the central figure
in a municipality. Before the introduction of
directly elected mayors, councillors were
responsible, together with the members of the
cabinet, both for executive matters and for the
function of overview and scrutiny. This created
considerable confusion about who was
responsible for what. Now, along with the
direct election of the mayor, the Italian
legislation has imposed a separation of powers
between the cabinet and the council, putting
the first exclusively in charge of executive
matters. Gianoli wrote (2010, p. 186) that ‘with
the direct election of the mayor, the electorate
directly confers legitimacy to the mayor, thus
entrusting him/her with the overall
responsibility for municipal government’. Thus,
there is now a greater accountability on roles
and responsibilities and ‘mayors are more
powerful but also more accountable than their
predecessors’ (Baldini, 2002, p. 366).
Individualization and personalization of power
The introduction of directly elected mayors
has impacted significantly on local power
dynamics in two main ways:
•Mayors and members of cabinets have become
the key gatekeepers of citizens’ and civic
groups’ interests and issues. In other words,
individuals have substantially replaced
parties in their traditional role of mediation
and representation of civic interests and
issues.
•Power has become more concentrated on the
mayor: for example, mayors appoint the
members of the cabinet, as well as
representatives in local quangos and
municipal corporations. This has contributed
to making the municipality an increasingly
candidate-centred institution.
Disempowerment of the local council and lack of
overview and scrutiny
When directly elected mayors were introduced,
it was intended that the administrative structure
would support the cabinet in executive matters
and the city council in their overview and
scrutiny role (Urbani, 2003). However, in
practice, almost all of the administrative
resources have been dedicated to supporting
the executive matters, leaving councillors
without the support they need for overview
and scrutiny. This situation is frustrating for
councillors from opposition parties and has
often led to their gradual disengagement.
The changes in local (and national) politics
The introduction of directly elected mayors
profoundly changed Italian local and national
politics. The three main impacts were:
weakening of the influence exercised by local
parties; the emergence on the national political
scene of new political movements led by mayors;
and increasing influence on national policy-
making by the mayors of large cities. The
weakening of parties was mainly caused by the
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trend towards greater personalization of
political campaigns (Vandelli, 1997), often
centred on the personalities of the mayoral
candidates rather than on urban issues. This
determined a direct relationship between
voters and the mayor that greatly diminished
the influence of political parties at the local
level.
This personalization of the political stage
has also successfully projected many mayors
onto the national scene: for example, in two
cases out of six, the two candidates for prime
minister for the centre-left coalition were
mayors, as well as the current prime minister,
Matteo Renzi, who was previously mayor of
Florence.
What can we learn from the Italian
experience?
Lesson No. 1: Creating a new power requires creating
a new counter-power
Introducing directly elected mayors had a
major impact on the distribution of powers.
The reform redistributed powers between
the executive branch of the local government
and the council. This has sometimes resulted
in local councillors being unable to properly
exercise their overview and scrutiny
responsibilities. The reform would have been
more beneficial if it had simultaneously
provided more powers and support for
overview and scrutiny. Moreover, in terms
of lessons to be learned, this situation
provides a warning about the importance of
institutional reforms being accompanied by
training for managing the transition and for
preparing all the people affected by the
reform to understand the key features of the
new arrangements.
Lesson No. 2: Directly elected mayors are powerful
energizers in local democracy and national politics
Lesson No. 2 deals with the role of the directly
elected mayors in the patterns of local
democracy and national politics. Italian directly
elected mayors have played a substantial role in
revitalizing local democracy through their more
direct and engaging style of communicating
with their constituency. A recent survey found
that the municipality is the level of government
that Italians trust the most (Demos, 2014).
Having been a directly elected mayor has
proven to be a key step towards a role in central
government, without pursuing the traditional
career path within political parties. This finding
may explain the reluctance of established
politicians to acknowledge the value of directly
elected mayors.
Lesson No. 3: Urban governance and local
government systems are not about just one person
Overall, directly elected mayors have provided
greater stability in Italian urban governance
than the previous system. However, this is not
only the result of having a directly elected
mayor, but on other mechanisms as well, such
as the strong majority prize provided by the
electoral law; the bond between the mayor and
the council; and the change in the political
culture of Italian local parties towards a stable
government being a key element for re-election.
So the debate about the advantages and
disadvantages of directly elected mayors, needs
to include all the other elements that
characterize local government systems and
affect urban governance.
Conclusions
In the early 1990s, Italian local government
was in dire need of institutional reform. The
Italian legislature thought that the introduction
of directly elected mayors would create stronger
leadership, better accountability and more
effective policy-making. The idea of having
better urban governance and stronger
leadership through directly elected mayors is
shared across different countries, as for example
with the recent decision of the UK government
to establish a directly elected mayor for the
Greater Manchester Combined Authority. After
more than 20 years’ experience, we can
conclude that the introduction of directly
elected mayors in Italy has had some positive
effects on urban governance in terms of better
political stability and greater accountability on
roles and responsibilities. However, there are
also some downsides in terms of
individualization and centralization of power
in the role of mayor without proper checks and
balances.
Moreover, impacts on leadership have been
problematic in some cases. Some mayors have
played a crucial role in the development of
Italian cities but, in other cases, mayors have
been a major barrier to progress. Drawing
from the Italian experience, we conclude that
giving so much power to a single person can be
very risky. Embracing a more sophisticated
view of leadership is necessary to avoid a
situation where the leader might not be
equipped to respond to complex challenges
(with increasingly shrinking resources) eroding
local democracy and creating public distrust in
government.
Moving from a leader-centric, static and
positional view of leadership towards acceptance
of a more distributed, pluralistic and interactive
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perspective of leadership (for example Hartley
and Allison, 2000) would be the best way forward
in the context of contemporary urban
governance. The debate around the issue of
directly (or not) elected mayors would, in this
case, be at the centre of a much bigger picture,
where the mayor would be one of several
elements that cities and communities need to
maximize their democratic, economic, social
and civic potential.
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